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Abstract. Phishing attacks are the primary cause of data and security breaches in 
businesses, public institutions, and private life. Due to inherent limitations and 
users’ high susceptibility to increasingly sophisticated phishing attempts, 
existing anti-phishing measures cannot realize their full potential. Against this 
background, we utilize methods from the emerging research field of Explainable 
Artificial Intelligence (XAI) for the design of a user-focused anti-phishing 
measure. By leveraging the power of state-of-the-art phishing detectors, our 
approach uncovers the words and phrases in an e-mail most relevant for 
identifying phishing attempts. We empirically show that our approach reliably 
extracts segments of text considered relevant for the discrimination between 
genuine and phishing e-mails. Our work opens up novel prospects for phishing 
prevention and demonstrates the tremendous potential of XAI methods beyond 
applications in AI. 
Keywords: Phishing Prevention, Explainable Artificial Intelligence, 
Interpretable Machine Learning, User-Centric XAI 
1 Introduction 
During the first weeks of the COVID-19 pandemic, a large number of US citizens 
received an e-mail ostensibly from their employers’ payroll department. The e-mail 
informed them that the federal government was considering a financial relief package, 
entitling them to a $1000 check. In order to benefit from this measure, they would need 
to verify “their email account for new payroll directory” by following a “Secure Link” 
included in the e-mail [1]. These e-mails are exemplary for a phishing attack: To gain 
sensitive information for malicious purposes, the sender imitates a trustworthy source 
and promises a personal benefit to deceive the user [2, 3]. 
Phishing attacks are the primary way in which identity theft and security breaches 
occur in businesses, public institutions, and private life [4–6]. Virtually all users of 
electronic communication are frequently subject to phishing attempts [6–8]. In light of 
this perpetually growing threat, IT security researchers and practitioners have 
developed a large variety of anti-phishing measures. Commonly, these are divided into 
three categories: Blocking malicious e-mails before they reach users, warning users, 
and training users not to fall for phishing [2, 4, 6, 8]. All of these measures are applied 
in practice with some success. Ultimately, however, due to inherent limitations, neither 
is effective in preventing phishing attempts from succeeding. While state-of-the-art 
phishing detectors that aim to identify and filter out phishing attempts are robust and 
versatile, they suffer from their limited accuracy [2, 8, 9]. In order to avoid a high 
number of false positives – i.e., mistakenly blocking genuine e-mails – the detectors are 
generally tuned for maximum precision [6]. Consequently, many e-mails that a detector 
identified as suspicious of constituting a phishing attack reach the user [2, 8, 9]. 
Therefore, user behavior is of paramount importance in phishing prevention. 
While the response rate to phishing e-mails varies widely between users and 
particular variants of phishing attacks, on average, 10% to 20% of users that receive a 
phishing e-mail act on it [5, 10, 11]. Anti-phishing training aims to reduce this rate by 
educating users on how to identify phishing attempts [2, 8]. However, while users 
successfully learn to spot telltale signs of phishing, they nevertheless fall for it in 
everyday situations, which is overwhelmingly attributed to a lack of awareness when 
performing routine tasks in a familiar and trusted environment [10–16]. Existing anti-
phishing measures that aim to raise the users’ attention, such as warning messages, are 
often ignored, as they are perceived as too generic [4, 6–8]. In summary, on the one 
hand, the need to avoid false positives prevents phishing detectors from realizing their 
full potential [6]. On the other hand, users do not benefit from the knowledge gained in 
anti-phishing training and remain susceptible to phishing because, in everyday life, they 
lack the required attention [11, 12]. 
Against this background, approaches from the emerging field of Explainable 
Artificial Intelligence (XAI) [17, 18] harbor to date untapped potential for the design 
of more effective user-focused anti-phishing measures [9]. In particular, XAI methods 
designed to explain the classification of text documents by black-box models [19, 20] 
could convey to the user which elements in an e-mail most strongly influenced a 
phishing detector in identifying it as suspicious. These explanations, which could be 
provided for all e-mails that a detector had to let pass to avoid false positives, constitute 
highly specific warnings that are expected to effectively raise the users’ attention [3, 9, 
11, 14]. Pursuing this basic idea, we design a novel approach that identifies phishing 
cues in suspicious e-mails by generating explanations for the output of a phishing 
detector. Thereby, we not only pave the way for more effective user-focused anti-
phishing measures but provide a glimpse of the potential applications of XAI in the 
realm of IT security and beyond. 
Following the Design Science methodology [21], the remainder of the paper is 
structured as follows: In Section 2, we survey research from the fields of phishing 
prevention as well as XAI and conclude with the research gap. Subsequently, in Section 
3, we describe the design of a novel XAI approach to extract cues and phrases from e-
mails that contribute to their assessment by a black-box phishing detector. In Section 
4, we demonstrate and evaluate the applicability of the approach using a real-world 
dataset. Subsequently, in Section 5, we summarize our findings and conclude our paper 
with a discussion of the limitations of our research and an outlook on future work.  
2 Related Work and Research Gap 
To lay the foundation for the design of our novel approach, in the following, we first 
summarize research on phishing attacks and the cues based on which both automatic 
detectors and users can distinguish phishing attempts from legitimate communication. 
Then, we provide a brief overview of existing anti-phishing measures and their 
respective strengths and drawbacks. Last, we introduce the research field of 
Explainable Artificial Intelligence (XAI) and survey XAI methods for explaining 
document classification. 
2.1 Phishing Attacks and Phishing Cues 
Phishing is a social engineering attack that aims to exploit specific weaknesses of users 
[4, 5, 7]. The attacker imitates a trustworthy source to gain sensitive information for 
malicious purposes [2, 4, 5]. A phishing attack typically consists of three phases [5, 6]: 
Circumventing IT security measures (e.g., a phishing detector) to deliver an electronic 
communication (e.g., an e-mail) to a user, convincing the user to engage in the intended 
activity (e.g., click on a link to a counterfeit website and enter their credit card details), 
and finally gaining from the attack (e.g., receive a payment). Most phishing attacks are 
carried out via e-mail and traditionally target a broad audience, e.g., all users of a 
popular online platform [5–7]. The e-mails include a link to a forged website, where 
users are asked to enter their login credentials, on which the attackers then capitalize. 
Increasingly, personalized attacks target employees of specific company departments 
or public offices using elaborately crafted e-mails that imitate communication by 
superiors or co-workers [5–7, 10]. Often, the goal is to initiate large payments or gain 
access to confidential information [5, 8, 10]. 
Researchers have identified cues that are helpful to distinguish between genuine and 
phishing e-mails through user studies [10, 13, 14, 22] and analyzing e-mails [3, 14, 23]. 
Among the main discriminatory elements are the sender’s address and other technical 
information in the e-mails’ header, the links included in the e-mail, and words and 
phrases in the e-mails’ text [3, 10, 14]. In contrast, the graphical design of an e-mail, 
visual elements, and the presence of legal information (e.g., a disclaimer) are of little 
informative value [3, 14]. 
Textual information is arguably the most relevant for users when distinguishing 
between genuine and phishing e-mails. On the one hand, increasingly sophisticated 
imitation of the style and design of e-mails renders these features unsuitable as 
discriminators [11, 14]. On the other hand, textual cues such as urgency require 
complex judgment and background knowledge [10, 23]. Thus, in contrast to technical 
cues (e.g., URL spoofing), they often cannot be unambiguously detected by automated 
filters [5–7]. Indeed, anti-phishing training places emphasis on textual cues and caution 
users’ against just considering the superficial properties of an e-mail [3, 11]. Table 1 
summarizes typical categories of textual phishing cues.  
Table 1. Typical categories of textual cues in phishing e-mails [2, 3, 10, 11, 14, 22, 23] 
Category Example from the IWSPA v2.0 dataset [24] 
Urgency You have 72 hours to verify the information, … 
(Appeal to) authority A message from the CEO … 
Importance We have reason to believe that your account was 
accessed by a third party. 
Positive consequence (reward) In return we will deposit $70 to your account … 
Negative consequence (loss) If you do not verify yourself, your account will 
be suspended. 
References to security and 
safety 
Security is one of our top goals at our company 
… 
Spelling mistakes and 
grammatical errors 
You were qualified to participate in $50.00 
reward surwey. 
Lack of personalization Dear Valued Customer, … 
2.2 Technical and User-Focused Anti-Phishing Measures 
Measures for phishing prevention are commonly divided into technical and user-
focused anti-phishing measures. While the former aim to block malicious e-mails 
before they reach users, the latter intend to prevent users from falling for phishing 
attempts [2, 4, 6]. 
Technical anti-phishing measures detect phishing e-mails by searching for common 
characteristics [6, 7]. Typical approaches include rule-based filters and machine-
learning-based detectors [6]. Filters are based on manually assembled blacklists [2, 25] 
and are thus inherently constrained to already known cues and patterns [5–7]. In 
contrast, machine-learning-based detectors learn to detect phishing e-mails from 
training on examples [6]. While earlier approaches relied on predefined features [7], 
modern deep learning methods autonomously identify intricate patterns in raw data and 
have demonstrated excellent performance in phishing detection [8, 26]. However, 
phishing detectors have to be configured such that no genuine e-mail is mistakenly 
classified as a phishing attempt and thus discarded [6, 9]. Indeed, it is the “concern over 
liability for false positives [that] is the major barrier to deploying more aggressive 
heuristics” [6, p. 79], which in turn limits the effectiveness of phishing detectors. 
Depending on the type of attack and target audience [cf. 5], studies found that 
between 5% and close to 50% of users that receive a phishing e-mail fall for the attempt 
[5, 10, 11]. Against this background, user-focused anti-phishing measures aim to reduce 
users’ susceptibility to phishing attacks. They comprise anti-phishing training as well 
as preventive mechanisms and warning facilities [2, 6]. Trainings aim to raise users’ 
awareness of the threat and educate them on how to identify phishing attempts. They 
are administered in the form of resources for self-study (e.g., texts [8], videos [27], or 
games [28, 29]), classroom-style training, and interventional training [2, 8, 10, 11]. In 
the course of the latter, imitated phishing e-mails are sent to users. When they fall for 
the simulated attack (e.g., by clicking on an included link), they are immediately 
presented with self-study material [2, 6, 10]. However, anti-phishing training is not 
sufficient to prevent users from falling for phishing attacks [2, 12]. While trainings have 
been shown to increase users’ ability to identify phishing attempts when tasked to do 
so [2, 6], trained users nevertheless fall for phishing in everyday situations [8]. 
Researchers have theorized and demonstrated that the cause for users’ high 
susceptibility to phishing is their lack of attention when performing routine tasks in a 
familiar and trusted environment [8, 12, 16, 30]. It is further amplified by users’ 
tendency to underestimate their vulnerability to phishing attacks [10, 28, 31]. Thus, 
preventive mechanisms such as regular reminders [10], warning messages [4, 10], or 
tooltips that help users to evaluate URLs [32] are employed to motivate users to stay 
alert and scrutinize all communication for phishing cues [6, 10, 32]. However, users 
often overlook or outright ignore these warnings when they are passive indicators or 
not perceived as specific and relevant to their current situation [2, 4, 7, 8, 10]. 
2.3 Explainable Artificial Intelligence and Generation of Explanations for 
Document Classification 
Since at least the rise of deep learning, AI systems have become ubiquitous. Thus, an 
increasing number of people are faced with the consequences of decisions and 
recommendations generated by effectively black-box systems [17, 33]. Against this 
background, the research field of Explainable Artificial Intelligence (XAI) focuses on 
automatically generating explanations for AI decisions [17, 18, 33, 34]. 
XAI methods can be distinguished by their aim and their dependency on a particular 
kind of machine learning model [18, 34]. In the context of explanations for AI systems 
for text and document classification (such as phishing detectors), both researchers and 
practitioners have taken a particular interest in outcome explanations [20, 35]. This kind 
of explanation is not concerned with revealing the inner workings of the AI system but 
aims to provide a human-understandable reasoning for one specific decision [34, 36]. 
One avenue to explain an AI system’s decisions in this manner is through local 
feature importance [18, 34]. The underlying idea is to assign a weight to each of the 
input’s features that reflects how strongly it contributes – positively or negatively – to 
the AI system’s decision. The SHAP family constitutes a popular example of such 
methods [37]. Some of its variants are model-agnostic, i.e., do not require access to the 
AI system’s internals and are thus applicable to any kind of AI system [36, 37]. A study 
by Weerts et al. [38] suggests that SHAP explanations succeed in drawing user’s 
attention to particularly influential features that they would otherwise have overlooked. 
However, explanations based on local feature importance do not necessarily transfer to 
other decisions by the same AI system [19, 34]. 
This limitation is addressed by several more robust XAI methods, which can be 
divided into search-based approaches and document classifiers with integrated 
explanation capabilities. Martens and Provost [20] define “explanations” as minimal 
sets of words that, if removed from the particular document under investigation, change 
the classifier’s prediction. To find explanations, they utilize a best-first heuristic search 
with search tree pruning. In the case of a non-linear classifier, two post-processing 
optimizations aim to ensure that the found set is indeed minimal [20]. Fernandez et al. 
[39] generalize this approach to replacing words instead of removing them and 
introduce a variable cost for replacement, allowing for more fine-grained control of the 
explanations’ properties. Similar to these “explanations,” the “anchors” introduced by 
Ribeiro et al. [19] are sets of words. However, instead of constituting a minimal set of 
words required for the classification, “anchors” aim to be representative of the AI 
system. They are defined as a set of words that, if present, is sufficient to guarantee the 
classification independent of changes to the remainder of the document. “Anchors” are 
built up word by word through local beam search [19]. 
Instead of generating explanations post-hoc [34], Lei et al. [35] train two joint 
machine-learning models to find explanations for the classification of texts. While an 
“encoder” model classifies a text, a “generator” model extracts the corresponding 
“rationales,” which are short phrases that, individually, are classified similarly as the 
full text. An objective function ensures both correct classification and the “rationales”’ 
characteristics, namely conciseness and coherence [35, 40]. With their 𝜏-SS3 classifier, 
Burdisso et al. [41] again pursue a different approach. 𝜏-SS3 is inherently interpretable, 
i.e., the AI system itself transparently reveals which word sequences in a text stream 
contributed most to its output. 
2.4 Research Gap 
Phishing is a pervasive threat for businesses, public institutions, and private individuals 
alike. Technical anti-phishing measures filter out malicious e-mails with increasing 
effectiveness. However, due to their limited accuracy, phishing e-mails nevertheless 
reach the inboxes of users, which consequently have a decisive role to play [2, 6, 7, 9]. 
Despite efforts to educate users, they frequently fall for phishing attempts, in particular 
for those that are sophisticated imitations of genuine e-mails [8, 10]. It is, however, 
generally not a lack of knowledge or awareness of the grave consequences but a lack 
of attention in everyday situations that makes users vulnerable [10, 12, 16]. Existing 
preventive mechanisms such as warning messages often remain without effect, as users 
perceive them as too unspecific and disregard them [4, 7, 8, 10]. 
In light of the power of modern phishing detectors, methods from the field of XAI 
appear as a promising foundation for the design of more specific, and thus, more 
effective user-focused anti-phishing measures [9]. Following this idea, based on 
outcome explanation methods for document classification [19, 20, 35], we design a 
novel approach that uncovers words and phrases in e-mails that are telltale signs of 
phishing. Our work paves the way for user-focused anti-phishing measures that 
effectively raise users’ attention and guide their assessment of suspicious 
communication [11, 15, 30, 31]. It further serves as an example of the potential of XAI 
methods to address problems of high practical relevance beyond the field of artificial 
intelligence.  
3 A Novel XAI Approach to Uncover Phishing Cues in E-Mails 
We design a novel XAI approach to draw the user’s attention to the telltale signs of 
phishing in a suspicious e-mail. The underlying basic idea is to generate explanations 
for a phishing detector’s assessment of an e-mail that serve as highly specific warnings. 
The starting point for our approach is a phishing detector. In the following, we 
describe it as a model 𝑚 that takes an e-mail 𝑥 as its input and outputs a score 𝑠 ∈ [0, 1] 
and treat it as a black box otherwise. All incoming e-mails for which 𝑚(𝑥) = 𝑠 > 𝑡𝑝ℎ𝑖𝑠ℎ 
are considered phishing e-mails and are filtered out before they reach a user’s inbox. 
Since the detection threshold 𝑡𝑝ℎ𝑖𝑠ℎ has to be set such that no genuine e-mails are 
discarded [cf. 6], many e-mails to which the detector assigns a high score – and thus, a 
high likelihood of being a phishing attempt – nevertheless reach the user [6, 8, 9]. 
Three design decisions characterize our approach. First, to be widely applicable and 
to not adversely interfere with the phishing detector’s performance, we design the 
approach to be model-agnostic [19, 39]. Second, we focus exclusively on textual cues, 
as these are most relevant to distinguish phishing from genuine e-mails and easiest to 
assess for laypeople [3, 11, 14, 23]. Third, to assist the users’ assessment, we strive to 
highlight precisely the telltale signs of phishing (cf. Table 1 and Figure 1). For this, we 
identify the words and phrases in an e-mail that significantly contribute to the phishing 
detectors score. In the following, we describe the design of our approach in detail and 
elaborate on the design decisions. 
3.1 Designing Explanations as Text Highlights 
The goal of our approach is to assist users in reliably identifying phishing e-mails. Thus, 
the explanations produced by our approach should match how people evaluate e-mails 
[11, 33, 42, 43]. Phishing research suggests that textual cues are most relevant to 
distinguish between genuine and phishing e-mails (cf. Section 2.1). On the one hand, 
textual cues are easiest to comprehend and evaluate for laypeople [3, 14]. On the other 
hand, they are the only cues present in types of phishing e-mails that do not rely on 
technical manipulation [6, 10, 11]. 
Against this background, we design our approach to produce explanations in the 
shape of text highlights (cf. Figure 1). Specifically, we highlight short sequences of text 
[35, 41], which offers three advantages. First, people are familiar with this concept from 
everyday life [cf. 42]. Second, the interpretation of the explanations does not require 
technical knowledge about their production [19, 44]. Further, the focus on textual cues 
avoids the adverse effects of cognitive biases associated with quantitative indicators 
such as confidence scores [33]. Third, the interpretation of text highlights demands 
substantial cognitive effort and thus encourages thorough evaluation [42], which is 
favorable for users’ ability to accurately identify phishing attempts [11, 15, 31]. 
To formalize the notion of text highlights, we represent an e-mail as a sequence of 
words 𝑥 =  [𝑥0, 𝑥1, … , 𝑥𝑁] [35, 45]. A text highlight explanation can then be 
represented by a binary vector 𝑎 of the same length as 𝑥, where 𝑎𝑖 = 1 indicates that 
the word 𝑥𝑖 is highlighted and 𝑎𝑖 = 0 indicates that it is not. 
3.2 Characteristics of Suitable Explanations 
The basic idea of our approach is to convey to the user which words and phrases in an 
e-mail influenced a phishing detector’s classification of the e-mail as suspicious. In the 
realm of XAI, the task of explaining a model’s output by uncovering which parts of the 
input contributed to its assessment has attracted considerable research attention (cf. 
Section 2.3). In the following, we draw from this prior work to derive and define the 
characteristics of explanations required in our application context. 
As worked out in the previous section, our explanations take the shape of text 
highlights. To ensure that the highlighted phrases indeed represent phishing cues, we 
demand that the phishing detector classifies them as suspicious themselves. In that 
regard, the explanations generated by our approach are similar to the “rationales” 
proposed by Lei et al. [35]. Taking into account that this assessment might be 
coincidental, we require the phrases themselves to be sufficient for the classification of 
the entire e-mail. More specifically, similar to the anchors defined by Ribeiro et al. [19], 
replacing the remainder of the e-mail with different words should have a negligible 
influence on the phishing detector’s assessment [cf. 39]. 
We capture these characteristics in the concept of a document anchor. For its formal 
definition, we resort to the perturbation set 𝐷𝑥 introduced by Ribeiro et al. [19]. For a 
given e-mail 𝑥, this set contains all possible variants 𝑧 that can be generated by 
replacing words in 𝑥 with either blanks or similar words [19, 39]. A particular sequence 
of highlighted words in an e-mail is a document anchor if it is present in most 𝑧 ∈ 𝐷𝑥 
that are classified similarly as the original e-mail, but not present in the 𝑧 ∈ 𝐷𝑥 for 
which this is not the case. More formally, a text highlight described by a binary vector 
𝑎 is a document anchor for 𝑥 if for any 𝑧 ∈ 𝐷𝑥 
 |𝑧⨀𝑎| = |𝑎| ⟹ 𝑚(𝑧) ≥ 𝑚(𝑥) − 𝜏, (1) 
where 𝜏 is an application-specific constant. 
In general, many document anchors exist for any given e-mail 𝑥. However, not all 
of them constitute a good explanation [19, 42]. On the one hand, an anchor that covers 
the entire document (𝑎𝑖 = 1 ∀ 𝑖) always fulfills the definition, but conveys no 
information to the user that is particularly helpful in distinguishing between phishing 
and genuine e-mails. On the other hand, while a few specific words might be sufficient 
to guarantee the correct classification, the user perceives text in phrases [41]. Thus, 
while prior work strives to find a minimal number of words in an explanation [19, 20, 
39], the shortest possible explanation is not necessarily the best in the eyes of the user 
[40, 42]. Based on these considerations, we require that the document anchors chosen 
as explanations both contain an appropriate number of words and consist of at most a 
few connected phrases. We encode these characteristics in an objective function that 
takes on a minimum value for an optimal anchor: 
 𝒪(a) = (|𝑎| − 𝑙)2 + 𝛽 ⋅ ∑ |𝑎𝑖 − 𝑎𝑖−1|𝑖  (2) 
The first term measures how far the number of highlighted words contained in the 
document anchor described by 𝑎 deviates from the desired target 𝑙. The second term 
measures the coherence, i.e., the number of connected sequences of words [35]. The 
coefficient 𝛽 weights the two terms and allows for fine-tuning of the explanations’ 
characteristics. 
3.3 Model-Agnostic Generation of Explanations for Suspicious E-mails 
Up to this point, we have defined the shape of the explanations and developed the 
concept of document anchors to capture their desired characteristics. What remains in 
the design of our approach is to devise a method that, for a given e-mail 𝑥, generates a 
document anchor 𝑎 that minimizes the objective function 𝒪(𝑎) [cf. 19]. 
As our approach is based on an existing phishing detector, the search for a suitable 
anchor cannot make any assumptions regarding the model’s inner workings. Therefore, 
we design our approach to be model-agnostic. This not only allows it to be used with 
any kind of phishing detector [18, 36]. It further ensures that the phishing detector’s 
functionality and performance are not affected in any way [19, 40]. Conversely, the 
phishing detector’s properties do not impose restrictions on the design of the method 
for the generation of explanations [34, 36]. 
Incorporating these benefits, we follow the general idea of search-based approaches 
[cf. 45]. The basic concept is to find and construct an anchor for an e-mail 𝑥 by probing 
the detector with perturbed versions of that e-mail [19, 20, 39]. Addressing the 
requirement that our approach should generate explanations that consist of phrases, we 
construct an anchor 𝑎 by combining individual phrases 𝑝 (𝑎 = ∑𝑝). 
In our approach, we generate perturbed versions 𝑧 ∈ 𝐷𝑥 by replacing words in the e-
mail [19, 39]. In line with the definition of a document anchor, we iteratively search for 
phrases 𝑝 that are present in those versions 𝑧 that the detector identifies as suspicious, 
but absent from versions of the e-mail that the detector considers genuine. To this end, 
we utilize local beam search [19, 45], which we initialize with 𝑁 seed phrases. Each 
iteration of the search consists of three steps. First, we generate 𝑁𝑐ℎ𝑖𝑙𝑑 child phrases 
from each of the 𝑁 phrases by growing, shrinking, or shifting the highlighted sequences 
of words. Second, we use the KL-LUCB algorithm [46] to determine the 𝑁 best phrases 
among the 𝑁 ⋅ 𝑁𝑐ℎ𝑖𝑙𝑑 children [19]. For this, we estimate the expectation value for a 
𝑧 ∈ 𝐷𝑥 that contains the phrase 𝑝 to be classified as suspicious by the model [19]: 
 𝔼(𝑝) = 𝔼|𝑧⊙𝑝|=|𝑝|[𝑚(𝑧) ≥ 𝑚(𝑥) − 𝜏] (3) 
We repeatedly refine these estimates until the lower bound on the expectation value of 
the 𝑁𝑡ℎ-best phrase surpasses the upper bound on the next-best phrase’s expectation 
value by at least Δ𝑚𝑖𝑛. The 𝑁 best phrases then form the set of 𝑁 phrases for the next 
iteration. To boost convergence, we keep a set of the 𝑁𝑒𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑒  best phrases that we add to 
the child phrases in every round of the search [45]. In the third and final step of each 
iteration, we merge the current set of 𝑁 phrases to an anchor candidate. If the objective 
function’s value for this candidate falls below a previously specified threshold or the 
number of iterations surpasses a given maximum, the search terminates. Both the 
threshold and the maximum number of iterations, as well as the beam search parameters 
𝑁, 𝑁𝑐ℎ𝑖𝑙𝑑, and 𝑁𝑒𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑒  influence the efficiency of the search and the consistency of the 
document anchors’ characteristics [19, 45].  
4 Demonstration and Evaluation 
In the following, as an essential part of the Design Science research process [21], we 
demonstrate and evaluate the efficacy of our approach. For this, we instantiate it using 
a real-world dataset and conduct a series of summative evaluations adhering to the 
Framework for Evaluation in Design Science Research (FEDS) [47]. 
4.1 Dataset and Phishing Detector 
The instantiation and subsequent evaluation of our approach requires a phishing 
detector and a set of both phishing and genuine e-mails. We use the English-language 
IWSPA-AP v2.0 dataset [24, 26] that was compiled to enable the comparison of 
machine-learning-based phishing detectors. It consists of 452 phishing and 3505 
legitimate e-mails. We randomly select 80% of each kind for the training set and leave 
the remaining e-mails as the test set. 
Using the training set, we instantiate a bidirectional LSTM (long short-term 
memory) recurrent neural network as the phishing detector, which is a standard model 
for text classification [45]. In line with real-world requirements [6], we aim to set the 
threshold above which we discard an e-mail as phishing 𝑡𝑝ℎ𝑖𝑠ℎ such that the false 
positive rate is minimal. To avoid fatigue due to frequent unsubstantiated warnings, the 
threshold 𝑡𝑠𝑢𝑠𝑝 above which an e-mail is considered suspicious should be set such that 
the probability that these e-mails are indeed phishing attempts is reasonably high [6, 
10]. We find that for the given detector and dataset, 𝑡𝑝ℎ𝑖𝑠ℎ = 0.98 and 𝑡𝑠𝑢𝑠𝑝 =  0.20 
achieve these goals, resulting in a false positive rate of 0.43% and the classification of 
16 genuine and 11 phishing e-mails as suspicious. Just 2.2% of phishing e-mails reach 
the user without explanations. 
4.2 Instantiation 
Our approach generates text highlight explanations by performing a local beam search 
guided by an objective function and repeated estimation of the expectation value 
𝔼(𝑝) (Eq. 3). Accordingly, in the following, we parametrize the required components. 
To generate the samples 𝑧 ∈ 𝐷𝑥 needed to estimate 𝔼(𝑝), we randomly replace 
words in the e-mail 𝑥 with blanks. Since evaluating 𝔼(𝑝) for a given phrase 𝑝 requires 
a 𝑧 for which |𝑧⨀𝑝| = |𝑧| (cf. Eq. 3), we can optimize the search’s efficiency by 
maximizing the likelihood that this condition is fulfilled. As 𝑝 generally consists of 
connected sequences of words, we do not randomly replace words but generate 𝑧 ∈ 𝐷𝑥 
that each contain a single sequence of varying length. To obtain an unbiased estimate 
of 𝔼(𝑝), the unconditional probability 𝑃(𝑚(𝑧) ≥ 𝑚(𝑥) − 𝜏) should be close to 0.5. 
We find that for the given phishing detector, 𝜏 = 0.15 𝑚(𝑥) is a suitable choice. We 
generate at most 1024 samples 𝑧 ∈ 𝐷𝑥 to limit the load on the phishing detector. 
To instantiate the search component, we first parametrize the local beam search. We 
use a beamwidth of 𝑁 = 10 and maintain an elite set of size 𝑁𝑒𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑒 = 4. We initialize 
the search with randomly placed phrases of three words. In each round, we generate 
𝑁𝑐ℎ𝑖𝑙𝑑 = 2 new phrases from each of the 𝑁 current best phrases by appending one word 
or shifting them in either direction. Finally, we parametrize the objective function (Eq. 
2) with a target length of 𝑙 = 10 and 𝛽 = 4, which we find to strike a suitable balance 
between highlighting relevant phishing cues and comprehensibility. We stop when 
𝒪(𝑎) ≤ 16.0 or five iterations have passed. Figure 1 displays an example of an 
explanation generated by our approach. 
 
Figure 1. Example of text highlights generated by our approach for a phishing e-mail that seeks 
to persuade users to provide their PayPal login credentials by invoking a sense of urgency, 
suggesting impending negative consequences, and alluding to standard security practices. 
4.3 Evaluation 
As suggested by FEDS, we explicate the goals and evaluation strategy before designing 
particular evaluation episodes [47]. The goal of the evaluation is to investigate whether 
our approach succeeds in generating explanations for suspected phishing attempts that 
help users distinguish between genuine and phishing e-mails. Owing to our research's 
exploratory nature, the main risks in the design of our approach are technically-
oriented. Thus, FEDS’ “Technical Risk & Efficacy” strategy, which prescribes a series 
of increasingly summative and naturalistic evaluations, is an appropriate choice [47]. 
For the individual evaluation episodes, we utilize the established concept of 
functionally-grounded evaluation of explainable systems defined by Doshi-Velez and 
Kim [48] and assess explanations using three proxy measures. Each proxy measure 
operationalizes a particular goal of our design. 
First, the highlighted segments of text should be classified similarly to the entire e-
mail, i.e., as suspicious. Thus, we take the score that the phishing detector attributes to 
the text highlights as the corresponding proxy measure (Score). 
Second, the explanations should be comprehensible for laypeople. For this, an 
explanation should consist of connected phrases rather than individual words scattered 
across the e-mail. Therefore, we take the number of highlighted sequences as the 
corresponding proxy measure (Comprehensibility). 
Finally, to draw the users’ attention to those elements in a suspicious e-mail relevant 
to assessing the threat, the highlighted parts of the text should represent phishing cues. 
To evaluate this, we let two researchers code the words in each of the suspicious e-
mails according to the categories in Table 1 and measure the text highlights’ overlap 
with the humans’ assessment. To account for the vastly different amount of phishing 
cues in the e-mails (ranging from 0% to 50% of words), we divide this value by the 
ratio of cues expected to be found when randomly selecting words to be highlighted 
(Relevance).  
To benchmark the values obtained for the proxies, we utilize two competing 
approaches: As the baseline, we create explanations by randomly highlighting 𝑙 = 10 
words in an e-mail (Random). Further, to assess the effect of the information our 
approach obtains from the phishing detector, we perform the local beam search with a 
fixed 𝔼(𝑝) = 1 (Search-only). To obtain statistically sound conclusions, we apply each 
approach fifty times for each of the 27 suspicious e-mails, assess the resulting 
explanations, and aggregate the results (Figure 2). 
 
Figure 2. Aggregated evaluation results. The arrows indicate the direction of better values. 
We find that our approach outperforms the competing approaches for all three proxy 
measures. First, the Score of the text highlights generated by our approach is 
significantly higher and exhibits a smaller variance (1st/2nd/3rd quartile .70/.92/.98) 
compared to Random (.12/.43/.84) and Search-only (.05/.29/.89). Second, our approach 
selects only 2.1 ± 1.0 phrases in an e-mail to be highlighted, rendering its explanations 
comprehensible. Third, despite selecting the fewest phrases, the words highlighted by 
our approach exhibit higher Relevance for distinguishing between phishing and genuine 
e-mails (.99/1.6/2.3) than the text highlights generated by Search-only (.44/.98/1.5), 
whose Relevance is similar to that of the Random baseline (.60/.98/1.3). The difference 
in Relevance is significant (Mann-Whitney 𝑈 = 1.20 ∙ 106, 𝑛1 = 𝑛2 = 1350, 
𝑝 < 10−3 one-sided, effect size 0.66), which validates that through 𝔼(𝑝) our approach 
indeed extracts the required information on phishing cues from the detector. 
In summary, our approach successfully generates explanations in the shape of text 
highlights that are well suited to draw the users’ attention to phishing cues in an e-mail. 
5 Conclusion, Limitations, and Outlook on Further Research 
Phishing is a threat to businesses, public institutions, and private individuals alike. 
Current anti-phishing measures ultimately fail at effectively preventing users from 
falling for phishing attacks. Against this background, XAI methods offer a promising 
path towards more effective user-focused anti-phishing measures that leverage the 
power of state-of-the-art phishing detectors. Pursuing this idea, we designed a novel 
XAI approach that identifies telltale signs of phishing in suspicious e-mails. Building 
on research in phishing susceptibility and anti-phishing training, we designed its 
explanations to raise users’ attention and assist their assessment of the potential threat. 
We demonstrated our approach utilizing a real-world dataset and a deep learning 
phishing detector. Rigorous functionally-grounded evaluation indicates that our 
approach succeeds in producing explanations that are both relevant and 
comprehensible. In addition to the design of a novel XAI approach, our research 
contributes to theory and practice in two ways. On the one hand, it validates the 
feasibility of utilizing XAI methods for the design of user-focused anti-phishing 
measures. On the other hand, it serves as an example of how XAI methods can be 
applied to address problems of high practical relevance beyond the field of AI. 
Although our work constitutes a substantial step, it is subject to several limitations 
that call for further research. First, by design, our approach can only uncover cues and 
phrases that the phishing detector identifies as suspicious. While our demonstration 
suggests that the detectors’ assessment matches that of users, this might not be the case 
for any phishing detector, restricting the applicability of our approach. Second, 
although we utilized a real-world dataset, a real phishing detector, and included human 
labelers, our evaluation is nevertheless artificial. With the technical design risks out of 
the way, an evaluation based on established concepts for the evaluation of user-focused 
anti-phishing measures is an essential next step. Third, while the design of the 
explanations was informed by research in phishing susceptibility, our approach in itself 
does not constitute a full user-focused anti-phishing measure. Further development 
towards its real-world application will, amongst others, require extensive user interface 
design. These limitations notwithstanding, our approach provides a first glimpse of the 
exciting potential of XAI methods for applications in IT security and beyond. 
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